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Abstract 
This article examines union revitalization in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on two 
countries: Hungary and Latvia. Trade unions have not only had to cope with a declining 
membership base, but have also had to respond to austerity programmes and 
government cuts in public sector employment. We argue that the inability of unions to 
provide a strong voice for alternative policies to the current neoliberal orthodoxy has 
been driven by a declining membership base, but also by weakened social dialogue 
mechanisms, limited industrial representation and an ageing membership profile, 
exacerbated by net outward migration in recent years. However, we find that unions in 









The global economic crisis and the neoliberal course of Europeanization have stimulated 
individualistic rather than collective actions from workers in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), stimulating east-to-west migration (Stan and Erne, 2016), confronting CEE trade 
unions with hard choices. Illusions about capitalism were widespread with the collapse of 
the Soviet system during 1989-91; but the transition to a market economy would entail a 
radical decline in living standards, intensification of work and chronic job insecurity. In 
the region, the idea of rapid, systemic change had been discursively packaged as a 
quick ‘entry into Europe’; this became the legitimating discourse for the transformation 
towards capitalism under an avowedly neoliberal agenda involving precarious labour 
markets, privatization, unemployment, social differentiation and the impoverishment of 
large sections of the population (Gowan, 1995: 53). 
Weakening of the organizational links between workers has reduced the visibility 
of workers’ issues; together with inter-EU emigration this has a negative impact on 
industrial relations in the countries concerned. With fundamental economic 
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transformation after EU accession, convergence with monetary union and recent 
austerity measures enacted as a result of the euro crisis, a Europeanization agenda 
oriented to economic efficiency and competitiveness has prevailed. This in turn has 
rendered the policy environment more unfavourable to union revitalization. Rather than 
being strong parties shaping policy decisions, trade unions have been marginalized. 
During the final stages of the accession negotiations, national governments as well as 
the EU sidelined them as interlocutors that could affect the shape of new Europe in the 
making (Korkut, 2002; 2007). Krzywdzinski (2010: 278) discusses the challenges in 
terms of five particular aspects: bargaining systems that are ‘decentralized and conflict-
oriented’; low collective bargaining coverage; limited union access to businesses; ‘high 
inter-union competition’; and ‘restricted access to political systems’. In addition to facing 
a neoliberal course of transformation, unions are also faced with the threat of becoming 
truly irrelevant for younger workers.  
Could unions be at the vanguard of offering an alternative to the neoliberal model 
of economic transformation? One first needs to understand what precludes them from 
having a strong voice in labour relations in the context of east-to-west migration by 
younger, highly qualified workforce and (partly as a result) an ageing membership. Stan 
and Erne (2016: 168) demonstrate that unions can use the migration argument to 
strengthen their own effectiveness only ‘if they are confronted with high levels of outward 
migration and retain the capacity to act strategically, including in the area of collective 
bargaining’. We question whether unions can indeed retain the capacity to act 
strategically, given emigration and ageing of their membership. Kahancová (2015) 
argues that the relationship between migration and union action can hardly be studied in 
CEE states with relatively low emigration rates. However, as in Hungary, it may be that 
statistics alone do not reveal the real trend of emigration and that qualitative data are 
needed to expose the underlying dynamics. 
In this article we examine why trade unions appear to lack the capability to 
present alternative policies to those that have afflicted the working classes in particular. 
As unions have become less attractive to workers as vehicles for collective action, 
expressions of social unrest have shifted to social media and impromptu 
demonstrations, and have become primarily individualized (Mrozowicki et al., 2010). In 
Hungary, the major demonstrations against the government during autumn 2014, in line 
with new social movements, were organized via social media, without formal structures 
and with abundant use of humour and aesthetics (Kálmán, 2015). Moreover, whilst 
vigorous endorsement of economic ‘shock-therapy’ and privatization has limited union 
influence throughout the transition to capitalism (Ost, 2002; 2009), the situation is now 
that trade unions have become irrelevant in debates of how workers fare amidst 
economic and political transformation. This is not due to any improvement to the 
advantage of workers, but rather because of the enhanced ability of other political 
forces, namely the radical and populist right, to respond to feelings of vulnerability 
amongst workers more convincingly.  
We further argue that migration is yet another reason why trade unions are 
‘becoming irrelevant’. Particular responses from trade unions to this general trajectory 
have been well-evidenced in the literature. In this respect, coalition-building with social 
movements and improving social representation are essential to promote union 
revitalization (Murray and Waddington 2005; Pulignano 2009). Before the new EU 
member states felt the full brunt of emigration, Meardi (2007) documented a range of 
new union practices across the region involving ‘the resurgent “voice” from below, 
through strikes, organizing campaigns, informal collective protests and collective 
bargaining innovations’. In contrast, Ost argues that trade union revitalization in CEE 
could lead to ‘aristocratic unionism’, predicting (2009: 13) that ‘labour is likely to remain 
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weak, with a few stronger unions emerging that are more elitist, male, “producerist”, and 
less class oriented’. 
Mrozowicki et al. (2010: 236) illustrate the critical role that workers’ agencies can 
play to this extent in the shape of efficient representation of economic interests in the 
workplace to attract new members to trade unions. However, it is less clear to what 
extent unions are able to engage with revitalization strategies and whether these can 
bring positive or negative outcomes as the competing claims above attest. Underpinning 
these debates is a more fundamental question as to the role of unions: whether in 
accordance with the Marxist tradition, they are vehicles to promote class struggle and 
replace capitalism, or whether they are vehicles operating in a pluralist set-up of 
accommodation with capitalism. These standpoints influence union attitudes towards 
engagement with the state and wider society. We propose that the demographic 
composition of unions and their degree of appeal to younger workers are at the heart of 
these concerns, but there is a lack of literature exploring these issues.  
Accordingly, we seek to assess these alternative claims through case studies of 
trade unions in Hungary and Latvia. With regard to an ageing membership, it is evident 
from previous literature that declining union density has been more severe in CEE than 
the EU-15. Waddington (2005) cites declines of 42.7 to 20.4 percent between 1995 and 
2001 in the states (largely CEE) admitted in 2004, as opposed to 31.0 to 27.3 percent in 
EU-15 countries during the same period. Comparative data on union density in CEE 
states is patchy, making direct comparisons difficult, but data from Visser’s database 
(http://archive.uva-aias.net/208, accessed October 10th 2016) suggests that union 
density1 declines have been particularly severe in Hungary, falling from 83.1% in 1990, 
to 20% in 2001. Similarly, Latvia also recorded in significant decline, falling from 46% in 
1992, to 20.2% in 2003 (ibid.). Keune (2015: 12) further noted that union density for the 
under-35s in Hungary stood at only 7 percent, whilst for the 50+ age group it was 32.8 
percent. The two countries are thus informative cases, not only in terms of the severity of 
the decline in membership, but also in terms of the divergence of union responses. 
These responses are explored below, where we present first the methodology that 
substantiates the article, before elaborating on contextual information on each country 




Methods and data sources 
 
We adopt a mix of primary and secondary data sources. With respect to primary data, 
the main method consisted of semi-structured interviews (for which an interview 
schedule is available from the authors). At the outset it should be emphasized that 
statistical data from Latvia was more accurate than that from Hungary. This was 
primarily due to the unitary trade union structure in Latvia, with one recognised union 
confederation LBAS (Latvijas Brīvo arodbiedrību savienība, Free Trade Union 
Confederation of Latvia) as against the fragmented structure in Hungary: five 
confederations at the time of writing, of which the largest is MASzSz (Magyar 
Szakszervezeti Szövetség, Hungarian Trade Union Confederation) formed by 
amalgamation in 2013. It was apparent that Hungarian unions encountered difficulties in 
                                                        
1 Union density is here defined as “net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners in employment” – where these are “employed wage and salary workers, source (unless 
stated otherwise) OECD, Labour Force Statistics” (http://archive.uva-
aias.net/uploaded_files/regular/ICTWSScodebook50-2.pdf ) 
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simply collecting data from their members. In the five interviews held at various levels in 
MASzSz and Liga (its main rival), all interviewees raised attention to this issue. 
Therefore, data from Hungary must be regarded as a rough estimate by the 
respondents, and will be supported by the available secondary data. In contrast, the 4 
interviewees in Latvia at LBAS and affiliated unions such as those in the 
communications, building, and education sectors were more precise with information.  
The interviews explored the following issues. First, whether respondents could 
describe the age structure of their membership and whether this had changed over time, 
in order to test how far trade unions were facing the issue of an ageing membership, 
partly because of emigration, and whether they could evolve into appealing voices for 
the younger workforce in general. With the exception of the teachers’ trade union in 
Latvia, none of the respondents provided an exact figure. The construction union in 
Latvia noted that they did have figures, but were reluctant to share them. The 
communication workers’ union, however, could state the numbers but did not provide 
exact figures. As noted above, in Hungary these figures were inaccessible even for the 
confederations. The only respondent in Hungary who could state the actual number was 
Balázs Kovács, the leader of the Vasas Mercedes Benz Manufacturing Trade Union. As 
he led a plant-based union, he clearly had exact figures. Nonetheless, he also stated 
that the confederations in Hungary did not know either the total membership numbers or 
their characteristics.  
Second, how did unions communicate with their members? This question 
reflected our assumption that social media such as Facebook and blogs would replace 
the traditional means of communication such as meetings and congress as well as 
newsletters. On this point, it became apparent that trade unions tended to shift to using 
new communication tools to the extent that they embraced managerialism. Our aim was 
also to see whether the use of new media tools could attract new workers as members. 
In brief, it seems that social media can work as a tool of communication to the extent 
that members have a desk-oriented work environment. However, in manufacturing and 
service industries (particularly retail), newsletters were still very effective. Finally, we 
also encountered altruistic activities such as charity events as tools for increasing the 
visibility of unions and hence attracting new members. Below we explore the impact of 
these different strategies, whilst relating this back to the fundamental theoretical issue of 
whether unions act either as interest groups seeking to accommodate capitalism 
whether they are social movements for reform.  
The organizational structure of trade unions in Hungary and Latvia was also 
explored. Our aim was to examine whether senior positions were more accessible to 
younger workers. As elaborated further below, this also related to unions’ recognition of 
the danger that an ageing membership posed for their membership as well as a shift 
towards managerialism in their day-to-day operations.  
Finally, we explored the impact of emigration on membership and whether unions 
had any strategies to deal with this issue. As explained above, Latvian statistics were 
more accurate than for Hungary. When it came to strategies, however, what mattered 
was whether unions could attract the attention of the political parties to this issue. In 
Latvia, LBAS has been more vocal on thanks to its emphasis on low salaries in the 
country. The Hungarian confederations, however, were sidelined on this issue because 
of the lack of communication between Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government and worker 
organizations. It looks as if both the unions and the government are oblivious to the 
issue of emigration. As discussed in the following sections, this supports the assumption 
that Hungary and Latvia would diverge in their approaches to emigration.  
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In both countries, trade union membership density is low by international standards: 11.6 
percent of total employment in Latvia in 2010, or just over 100,000 employees in 2012 
(ETUI, 2015); and 12 percent in Hungary in 2009. Union representatives confirmed 
these numbers in our interviews. But there are significant variations within both 
countries. In both countries, what appears to affect the unionization rate is whether 
workers can see any immediate returns for their membership fees. At plant level, the 
nature of relationship that union representatives and employers establish also appears 
to affect workers’ interest in joining the union. Foreign multinationals seem to develop 
these relations better than national firms (interview with Balázs Kovács, Budapest, 8. 
February 2016).  
As already noted, emigration poses particular challenges. With EU accession, 
hundreds of thousands of workers left their countries for EU member states willing to 
take them: Ireland, the UK and Sweden imposed no transitional restrictions. In some 
sectors, entire occupational groups left on such a massive scale that serious supply 
shortages ensued in their home countries, such as in the health sector in Estonia and 
Latvia, and skilled labour in the industrial and construction sectors generally. In Hungary, 
the negative impacts of migration could be seen in health care and the IT sector. Though 
dated, the 2012 Manpower Survey indicated that 35 percent of companies interviewed 
reported labour shortages. Furthermore, research published by the Demographic 
Institute of the Central Statistics Office (2013) showed that 7.4 percent of those in the 
age group 14-49 (around 335,000 people) moved abroad. This explained increasing 
applications for tax numbers in the Western Europe by Hungarian nationals (Tóth 2013: 
7). However, in comparison to Latvians, Hungarians were relatively new migrant workers 
in the West.  
According to Egils Baldzens, Vice-President of the LBAS confederation, Latvia 
has lost 10 percent of its workforce through emigration, particularly in younger age 
groups (interview, Riga, 12 February 2016). In Hungary, the government does not 
publish exact statistics on migration, to avoid facing the difficult question why so many 
younger Hungarians are leaving their homes to work in the west (interview with Laszlo 
Kozak, Liga, Budapest, 5 February 2016). Whilst evidence suggests that the intense 
post-EU-enlargement labour migration from CEE states has had a considerable impact 
on unions in the sending countries, responses seem to diverge. Latvian unions seemed 
to be relatively cognisant of the impact of emigration on their members (interviews at 
LBAS and affiliates, Riga, 10-11 February 2016); but Hungarian unions were either 
oblivious (interview at MASzSz in Budapest, 7 February 2016) or were otherwise 
impotent to offer any solutions (interview at Liga, 3 February 2016) to the effects of 
emigration on their membership. However, migration could have offered unions an 
opportunity to strengthen their bargaining positions, as it generated labour shortages 
and, in consequence, an upward pressure on wages.  
Eventually, the departure of workers alters labour force composition, which 
translates into a direct effect on unions in terms of changes in union membership and 
density rates. This effect largely depends on the socio-demographic profile of emigrants. 
If these belong to groups with a low propensity to unionize --- the un(der)employed, 
unskilled, young or students, as the expert on youth affairs in MASzSz indicated 
(interview, Budapest, 10 February 2016) --- then migration might not entail losses in the 
current union membership, and hence might not change the membership base. It could 
even produce an increase in union density in the short run if migrant workers are not 
replaced by immigrants from other countries (unlikely given the current anti-immigrant 
stance of national governments). If, however, migrants belong to groups with a high 
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propensity to unionize (skilled workers or professionals, and middle-aged or older, 
employed in the public sector), unions could expect losses of current (and potential) 
membership, and hence decreasing density rates. This also means losses in institutional 
resources and unions’ capacities for action, and as a consequence less potential for 
seizing opportunities from indirect migration effects. At interviews, the Latvian unionists 
articulated this more distinctly than their Hungarian counterparts. We now consider in 





Following EU membership, a neoliberal course of reform turned into an all-
encompassing truth, facilitating and legitimizing economic reform policies in Hungary 
with the primary goal of Eurozone accession. When the economic crisis in 2008 put 
Hungary’s national debt-to-GDP ratio at highest level in the developed world, it 
exacerbated the neoliberal tone of transformation. The primary impacts were that of 
wage cuts and unemployment hitting previously safer sectors such as the public sector 
(Cseres-Gergely; Kátay, and Szörfi 2013). In November 2008, Hungary had to use an 
emergency loan of around 20 billion euro from IMF to avoid insolvency as the global 
financial crisis gripped its markets. As a response to the financial crisis, a technocratic 
government took office in April 2009, replacing the left-liberal coalition, and introduced 
radical fiscal reform to reduce the country's large public debt. This political and economic 
quandary prepared ripe conditions for the neo-conservative Fidesz government led by 
Viktor Orbán winning at the 2010 election.  
The Fidesz regime fostered a voluntarist economic system that supported a 
patriotic economic policy appealing to the defence of families and to national interests 
and sovereignty. An unreasonably low level of economic legislation was flanked by ad 
hoc economic decisions. The new economic rules had no regard for the economic 
capacities of the country, global economic changes, the requirements of international 
and national economic collaboration, the rule of law, harmonization of stability and 
accountability, fiscal, monetary, and income policy or the social impacts of economic 
decisions (Békesi 2014). Voszka (2014) argued that Orbán neither accepted a neoliberal 
nor a welfare state and aspired to choose another route: he was a neoliberal with 
respect to tax and social policy, whilst remaining paternalist in decreasing energy and 
water charges for families.  
This economic governance regime affected trade unions. The Fidesz government 
initiated an economic transformation to tackle the two inherent problems of the 
Hungarian economy: high debt and high unemployment. It pursued low wages as a 
branding strategy to attract foreign investment in manufacturing, with the slogan ‘the 
Hungarian labour force is well qualified and cost effective, which increases the country’s 
international competitiveness’. The Hungarian minimum wage was far below the norm in 
EU-27 and in order to comply with fiscal deficit targets, the public sector was forced to 
impose severe reductions in wage costs (around 25 percent) (Cseres-Gergely et al., 
2013).  
The Fidesz government disregarded social dialogue and moved away from 
national tripartite structures. Orbán’s position since the mid-1990s has been that trade 
unions belong to the past. Fidesz’s approach has also been that social dialogue should 
merely operate as a mechanism to ‘carry out what the government has already decided’ 
(interview with György Károly, MASzSz), in line with a majoritarian democracy whose 
legitimacy rests on traditional family values, religion, spirituality and patriotism (Ladányi 
and Szelényi, 2014) rather than dialogue with social partners. Hence, while there are 
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merely two tripartite structures to co-opt workers; the National Occupational Health 
Committee and National ILO Committee, they operate as showcases for the international 
community and follow ‘dialogue but not negotiation’ (Károly).  
In the absence of social dialogue, trade unions could not present any tangible 
benefits to their members (interviews at Liga and MASzSz, 4 - 10 February 2016, 
Budapest). Therefore, gaining visibility is the most important issue for trade unions. 
According to Károly, at the factory level the benefits of union membership are more 
visible, given that everyone knows who the union negotiator is and what they have 
achieved. Also, he indicated that unions suffer from lack of access to public and private 
media sources to illustrate what they do. In order to see if this was the case, the authors 
approached the union leader at the Mercedes-Benz Manufacturing Hungary (MBMH) 
Vasas plant, Balázs Kovács. This was a particularly young trade union with an average 
age in the mid-30s and a unionization rate above 50 percent in the plant (out of around 
2000 workers). According to Kovács, they owed their success primarily to their 
employer’s involvement, and the recognition that unions were important for 
communicating with their employees.  
With regards to diversification of their communication tools towards social media, 
for Kovács it was not the tools of communication that mattered but rather the services 
that they provided. The provision of discount cards for shopping was one of their 
services. However, their continuous investment in community-building through 
organizing family days, Christmas and Easter events, and assisting with funerals and 
housing (in the instance of two homeless workers) made them more visible. They also 
operated Facebook and internet pages. They had approximately 400 members for their 
Facebook page, but at the time of writing their internet page was blank. Considering his 
success at the factory level, we enquired why Kovács would not aim to work at a more 
senior (confederal) level. He responded that the means to do so were blocked, even if 
he were to wish for a more active role at the confederation. However, in a different 
confederation, Liga, the communications expert László Kozák stated that the heads of 
the factory unions preferred to remain where they were simply because then they could 
remain key figures and run their own estates (4 February 2016, Budapest).  
Another factor, however, was that the ‘old guard’ continued to occupy decision-
making roles within the confederations. Previous research by Korkut (2005) 
demonstrated how trade unions carried out internal decision-making in Hungary. In the 
main, the heads of federations and confederations interviewed for that study were still 
occupying the same posts in Hungary more than 15 years later. They were the main 
obstacles for younger workers to join and become involved, and were out of touch with 
the requirements of new communication technologies, such as providing smart phones 
to their communication officers to follow up with e-mails (interview at KASz retail workers 
federation, 9 February 2016, Budapest). In addition, they did not train and prepare the 
younger generations for leadership positions. ‘Younger generations can only come to 
leadership positions by fighting’, but they lack leadership qualities without training 
(Károly).  
In this environment, trade unions struggled to become visible and attractive to 
younger workers. In Hungary, as traditional instruments of interest representation have 
become blocked, unions tended to shift more towards charity acts and social 
responsibility events such as anti-racism flashmobs or pancake days to help the local 
hospital. However, these activities did not differ much from local Rotary Clubs as an 
example. The communication officers both at the confederation and the KASz federation 
complained that it was extremely difficult to develop activities that would attract younger 
workers. In the retail sector, people did not have time after working hours for trade union 
activities. At the factory level, Kovács also complained about the general individualism 
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that gripped younger people. Their activities have been successful to maintain links with 
their members. However, those activities are also for families and do not necessarily 
attract individuals. At the Liga confederation, Kozák complained that working hours were 
organized in such a way that there was no time left not only for trade union activities but 
also general socialization where people could discuss issues of common interest.  
Finally, the approximate number of Liga members below the age of 35 was 33 
percent of 100,000 members in total. However, of these, only 30 members took part in 
union activities. Liga had an average membership age of 45, according to Kozák, and 
given their very decentralized structure he was not even sure that the federations were 
communicating their activities to their members. This was unlike Western European 
countries where unions were more centralized and could easily communicate to 
individual members.  
In Hungary, immigration did not become an immediate exit option for workers 
until after the global financial crisis hit the country. According to Hárs (2009), this was 
because Germany and Austria, the main destination countries for Hungarians, took a 
strict line on maintaining control over their labour markets from the beginning of the 
enlargement negotiations. Even within the UK labour market, the share of Hungarians 
amongst workers from CEE states remained low and did not show a notable increase 
until 2007. However, emigration became increasingly apparent amongst younger 
workers post-crisis. A 2013 survey suggested that 25 percent of respondents aged 18-
39 expressed the intention to obtain long-term work abroad, with a further 23 percent 
desiring short-term work. From 2012 to 2013 the number of Hungarians living in 
Germany increased by 26 percent, which is one of the highest growth rates, following 
those of the migrants from Romania and Syria (Borbély and Neumann 2014).  
Hungarian statistics reveal that younger workers as a percentage of the active 
population have significantly decreased. Between 1998 and 2010 the activity rate of 15-
19 year olds decreased from 15 to 3.7 percent, and that of the 20-24 year olds from 60.6 
percent to 44.8 percent, meanwhile the activity rate of 25-29 years old increased from 
72.8 to 77.2 percent. Hungary has one of the lowest employment rates in the EU (in 
2013 for persons aged 15-64 it was 59 percent, as against 64 percent for the EU28) and 
this was even more accentuated in the case of younger workers. The employment rate 
in 2013 for persons aged 15-24 was 19.7 percent (in the EU27 it was 32.6 percent) and 
for persons aged 25-29 was 68.8 percent (in the EU27, 71.9 percent). There is also an 
increasing share of precarious jobs, especially for young and low-skilled. Fixed-term 
employment in Hungary is not frequent (less than 10 percent of all labour contracts are 
fixed-term), but their proportion is much higher in the case of young people (around 25 
percent). The share of unemployed young people increased as a result of the crisis from 
2008 onward. The improvement in Hungarian economy, so far, has been partly due to 





Unlike Hungary, Latvia, as a former constituent republic of the Soviet Union, faced the 
additional challenge of becoming a nation state as well as democratizing and embracing 
market reforms. However, in common with other CEE states, the dominant feature of 
transformation has been the process of privatization under the auspices of a neoliberal 
regime with strong nationalist overtones that has promoted macroeconomic ‘stability’ 
and hence tight control over government spending (Bohle, 2010). This resulted in 
unprecedented opportunities to expropriate the gains of privatization, and EU entry only 
increased pressures for flexibilization and informalization of the Latvian economy (Likic-
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Brboric et al., 2013). Latvia was the first country in the CEE region to implement severe 
welfare state ‘reforms’. However, the social costs involved in these transformations were 
legitimized through the construction of an identity politics so as to ‘instill tolerance for 
social hardship’ (Bohle, 2010: 5). It was notable that respondents commented in this 
regard that they only communicated to members in Latvian (and not Russian). In this 
context, the burden of welfare reform has fallen disproportionately on Latvia’s large 
Russian-speaking minority. EU membership and access to transnational finance, as well 
as strong domestic wage growth aided by outward migration, ameliorated the worst 
effects of these policies for the majority. 
However the downturn in 2008 exposed the fragility of these arrangements and 
social discontent amongst the Latvian majority has increased since the onset of the 
financial crisis (Bohle, 2010). The government was forced to take out an IMF loan of 
€1.7 billion in December 2008, accompanied by a structural adjustment programme 
noted by Bohle (2010: 11) as having been ‘tough even by IMF standards’. By 2010 these 
austerity measures had seen a fall in government spending of 12 percent compared to 
2008 levels (Kallaste and Woolfson, 2013: 257). Hence the labour market situation for 
Latvian workers deteriorated, with the total number of employees falling by over 17 
percent, from 946,800 in 2008 to 782,400 in 2014 (Latvijas Statistika, 2015). The public 
sector has been a particular focus of cutbacks, with a 20 percent fall in employment 
during 2010 alone (Kallaste and Woolfson, 2013: 258). Conversely, the number of 
officially unemployed rose from 88,500 in 2008 to a peak of 205,000 in 2010, before 
falling to 107,600 by 2014. This suggests that for those made unemployed, recovery 
since the crisis has been insufficient to restore previous employment levels. As such, 
unemployment for many appeared to be a route to labour market exit, with the number of 
hidden unemployed (here defined as those individuals who were economically inactive 
because no work was available) having increased sharply in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis; more than doubling between 2008 and 2009.  
Another consequence of a stagnant labour market has been outward migration. 
This increased significantly after 2008, and net migration remained negative in the post-
crisis period. An examination of employees by age group suggests that younger workers 
are most likely to emigrate: Latvijas Statistika data suggest that those aged 15-24 have 
experienced the greatest proportionate falls in employment, and an increase in the share 
of those aged 55-64 and 45-54. This finding was reinforced by a 2007 study of 8,005 
Latvian residents during 2006 by Krišjāne et al. (cited in Eglīte and Krišjāne, 2009: 275-
6), which found that 16.6 percent of respondents aged 20-29 and 15.4 percent of those 
aged 30-39 had worked abroad, as opposed to 12.4 percent of those aged 40-49 and 
8.5 percent of those aged 50-59. Younger workers were also more likely to be high-
skilled, and it is notable in this context that of those in the survey who had worked 
abroad, 30.9 percent had a tertiary qualification, as opposed to 21.1 percent of those 
who did not (Eglīte and Krišjāne, 2009: 277). Destination countries were primarily within 
the EU, particularly the UK and Ireland. Such individuals were primarily motivated to 
move by higher wages, although ‘gaining experience’ and improving language skills 
were also cited (Eglīte and Krišjāne, 2009: 277). 
Whilst there have been attempts to establish tripartite arrangements, to the 
extent that these have functioned, they have merely served to legitimize austerity 
measures, and social dialogue remains ‘biased towards the government’ with minimal 
input from unions (Kallaste and Woolfson, 2013: 260). This view was reiterated by 
respondents, with the vice-president of the science and education union LIZDA (Latvijas 
Izglītības un Zinātnes Darbinieku Arodbiedrības), for example, commenting that despite 
the recent election, the expectation was that a centre-right coalition would continue 
(interview, 11 February 2016). A union can be established with a minimum of 50 
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members and in February 2015 there were 218 registered unions with 199 officially 
listed as ‘active’. As such, union membership has fallen dramatically since the collapse 
of communism; from over 275,000 members in Latvia in 1995 (ETUI, 2015). There is 
currently only one union confederation in Latvia, LBAS (Latvijas Brīvo Arodbiedrību 
Savienība), which represents 20 individual affiliated unions, the largest being the LIZDA 
in the science and education sectors (approximately 30,000 members), LDzSA (Latvijas 
Dzelzceļnieku un Satiksmes Nozares Arodbiedrība) in railways and transport 
(approximately 13,000 members), LVSADA (Latvijas Veselības un Sociālās Aprūpes 
Darbinieku Arodbiedrība) in health and social care (approximately 12,000 members), 
and LAKRS (Latvijas Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu un Transporta Darbinieku Arodbiedrība) 
for those working in transport and public services (approximately 7,000 members) in 
2012. 
In considering the nature of union revitalization, it was apparent from the 
interviews that the union that had been most successful in this regard was LIZDA. The 
union has made a conscious effort to engage with younger workers, through the 
establishment of a ‘young teachers’ council’ and the appointment of a vice-president 
(aged 28 at the time of writing), who had a background in public relations. His view of 
union effectiveness was grounded in the notion that a union was an enterprise (albeit a 
‘social enterprise’) that was competing for members and thus had to provide an efficient 
service: ‘if you look at unions as a social enterprise, then you need the management 
functions: operations, marketing and so on. A more professional approach, as the 
members are more and more asking: if they pay for your salary, what can they get for 
that? In this context, as with the Hungarian case, unions would appeal to prospective 
members in terms of the benefits they could offer, for example, store discount cards, 
legal services, free software downloads, or even the establishment of an insurance fund 
to cover members against accidents. 
Related to this, as we have mentioned, all the representatives interviewed 
recognised the importance of using contemporary communication tools to engage with 
current members and to recruit new members, This was more marked for white-collar 
unions, but it was not seen as a panacea: the respondent from the communications 
union noted that ‘face-to-face’ meetings were still the most useful way of establishing 
dialogue with members. Each of the union representatives mentioned that their union 
engaged with social media and had a Facebook page, and made regular use of Skype, 
email and posting information on their websites, and all of the respondents mentioned 
that they had a dedicated press office: a function they felt was essential to promote their 
visibility in the national media as being involved in ‘responsible’ social dialogue with 
employers and the government. 
In evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies, it was apparent that while 
these unions were very innovative in terms of servicing existing members and trying to 
recruit new ones, external (macro) factors continued to inhibit any significant growth. 
Respondents were keen to emphasize that they were ‘responsible’ social partners, but 
felt that the neoliberal environment militated against their appeal, and that the recent 
thrust of labour legislation had made the operating environment more hostile, with the 
government emphasising the growth of flexible forms of work, such as zero-hours 
contracts. The impact of outward migration continued to be felt, particularly in skilled 
sectors, with the communications union respondent noting that IT specialists could 
command ‘excellent’ wages in Norway (interview, 12 February 2016), whilst the LIZDA 
representative commented that lack of government support for basic funding of research 
and development meant that scientists continued to be targeted by foreign companies 
and to seek work abroad.  
Moreover, in trying to appeal to younger workers, basic difficulties were apparent 
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in that the younger generations had far less notion of organizing collectively, and merely 
regarded unions as fee-for-service providers. In terms of average age of the 
membership, the telecommunications union reported between 30 and 40 years, but the 
LBAS respondent commented that the average age of a union member was more likely 
to be between 40 and 50. Thus, while the situation of younger workers could be 
regarded as precarious in terms of job security, they did not recognize this as a 
collective issue for mobilization against; they were described by respondents as short-
term in their orientations and individualistic in their outlook. The construction union had 
accepted that pecuniary concerns were paramount for young people and had engaged 
with students at technical colleges by offering them free membership whilst they were 
students, as this enabled easier access than attempting to approach workers at building 
sites directly: ‘you need to have permission from the employer to enter, and you can 
imagine that it's not going to be that easy if you state that you want to recruit workers to 
the union’ (interview, 12 February 2016). 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The findings presented above suggest that unions in Latvia and Hungary have followed 
different trajectories in terms of responding to the pressures brought about by operating 
in the Single Market, adjusting to a dominant neoliberal austerity agenda, and the related 
phenomenon of labour force emigration to western European countries. Both countries 
have suffered particularly in the post-crisis period of austerity, with government policies 
that have favoured market-led reforms but in practice have resulted in continued labour 
market stagnation. Both countries have also seen the emergence of an identity politics 
that has sought to shore up societal cohesion despite unpopular economic policies by 
diverting attention to purported ‘external threats’.  
However, the Latvian and Hungarian cases diverge in terms of how unions have 
first acknowledged and responded to migration and second how they have attempted to 
maintain membership. The Latvian unions have shifted towards managerialism, relying 
on the appointment of younger experts to senior positions in order to maintain 
communication and attract younger members. These younger specialists can reach 
decision-making positions for networking and communication, although they do not 
necessarily come from traditional-working class backgrounds. In contrast, the Hungarian 
union movement was faced with fundamental structural troubles and a leadership 
seemingly oblivious to workers’ concerns. Accordingly, the incumbent trade union elite 
that has occupied presidential positions for decades has resisted the contribution that 
professional experts in communications and marketing could make. In both countries, 
unions have succeeded in maintaining their membership base and attracting younger 
members only to the extent that they have concentrated their activities on issues that 
appeal to traditional self-interest representation.  
What do these findings suggest for a broader agenda of union revitalization in 
CEE countries? Our research suggests, first, that unions, rather than being a vehicle for 
a nascent class struggle, continue to be organizations that operate in a market 
environment and vie for membership on the basis of whatever ‘benefits’ they can 
procure for their members – despite the enactment of austerity economic policies. The 
Latvian unions in particular appeared to be less class-oriented and tended to what Ost 
(2009) termed producerist in character, but they also demonstrated innovative 
approaches to appeal to younger workers. This provided a clear contrast to the 
Hungarian case, where union structures appeared to have ossified despite one of the 
most severe falls in union density in Europe, and there was little manifest interest from a 
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long-entrenched union leadership in engaging with new technologies or new means of 
communication to recruit new members. 
Second, in both cases, unions’ recruiting and organizing abilities were 
constrained by the fact that the unions concerned were relatively limited in terms of their 
resources to mobilize and recruit members. Furthermore, unions have continued to be 
weakened by an unfavourable labour market environment in CEE countries that has 
seen prolonged high unemployment in the aftermath of the economic crisis, and the 
related phenomenon of outward labour migration that has disproportionately involved the 
younger and higher-skilled workers that unions need to recruit. However, union 
respondents were mixed in terms of their view of the impact of outward migration, 
although the key concern was whether such migrants belonged to groups with a high 
propensity to unionize: suggesting that there was no simple (negative) relationship 
between outward migration and union density and effectiveness. However, migration 
combined with high unemployment and unfavourable government policies has in turn 
contributed to a consequent ageing of the membership. This ageing, evident in both 
countries, was a process that curtailed the natural handover of trade union activism from 
the older generation to younger workers. This in turn could be seen as a long-term 
impact of the lack of internal union democracy that Baccaro (2001) and Korkut (2007) 
have previously discussed.  
It is possible, of course, that in the current political climate pressures within EU 
countries will grow to limit the freedom of movement that has contributed to this 
phenomenon (as the ‘Brexit’ referendum that has resulted in the UK voting to leave the 
EU and the associated current negative focus on EU migrants attests). However, it 
remains to be seen what impact, if any, this would have on CEE countries, as freedom of 
movement within the Single Market continues to be a principle that EU members abide 
by. Apparent, however, is that political developments in CEE countries have continued to 
favour right-wing populist regimes that have been at best ambivalent to the interests of 
organized labour. 
In this context, any notion of union revitalization can only be considered in terms 
of a broader alternative agenda to challenge the current neoliberal orthodoxy. For unions 
in CEE countries in particular, the ability to link up to wider international movements, and 
exert pressure on national governments, through bodies such as the ILO and the ETUC, 
is paramount. In this sense, technology has been an enabler, in allowing rapid 
dissemination of information, and enabling groups to come together to protest. However, 
unions also have a role to play in wider civic society and linking up with other groups that 
share an anti-austerity platform. In this context, unions need to adjust to the current 
environment if they are to renew their appeal, especially to younger workers. Hence, 
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